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Abstract: This paper explores Nicholas of Cusa’s framing of the De pace fidei as 
a dialogue taking place in caelo rationis. On the one hand, this framing allows 
Nicholas of Cusa to argue that all religious rites presuppose the truth of a single, 
unified faith and so temporally manifest divine logos in a way accommodated to 
the historically unique conventions of different political communities. On the 
other hand, at the end of the De pace fidei, the interlocutors in the heavenly 
dialogue are enjoined to return to earth and lead their countrymen in a gradual 
conversion to the acceptance of rites which would explicitly acknowledge the 
metaphysically presupposed transcendent unity of all true faiths. In light of 
these two aspects of the literary framing of the De pace fidei, the question that 
motivates this paper concerns the extent to which the understanding of history 
subtending Cusanus’ temporal political aims is consistent with the 
understanding of history grounded in his metaphysical presupposition that 
there is una religio in omni diversitate rituum. In addressing this question, I 
shall argue that the literary strategy of the De pace fidei sacrifices Nicholas of 
Cusa’s apologetic doctrinal aims insofar as the text creates an allegorical space 
in which the tension between its literal and figurative dimensions assigns to its 
readers the task of choosing their own orientations to the significance of 
history as a foundation for future action.  
Keywords: Nicholas of Cusa, Cusanus, De pace fidei, interreligious dialogue, 
religious diversity  
 
Nicholas of Cusa’s explicit aim in the De pace fidei is to argue for the thesis that, 
by means of interreligious dialogue, “a single easy harmony could be found and 
through it a lasting peace established by appropriate and true means” between 
the diverse religions of the world.2 However, the “appropriate and true means” 
                                                                        
1 The author would like to thank Donald Duclow, Michael Bathgate, and Thomas Thorp for 
their helpful input on this paper. 
2 § 1.1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the De pace fidei are from the text provided 
in Biechler and Bond 1990. Latin references are to Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia iussu et 
auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heigelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita as reproduced by the 
Cusanus Portal of the Institute for Cusanus Research at the University of Trier 
(http://www.cusanus-portal.de/). Chapter and section references for all works follow those of 
the Opera omnia. In this case, Biechler and Bond’s translation is derived from the last two 
clauses of the following sentence: Accidit ut post dies aliquot, forte ex diuturna continuata 
mediatione, visio quaedam eidem zeloso manifestaretur, ex qua elicuit quod paucorum 
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that Nicholas has in mind seem to be qualified by his explicit admission that only 
those who are “vigorous in intellect” would be able to understand that “there is 
one religion and worship, which is presupposed in all the diversity of rites.” (§ 
6.16)3 Therefore, Nicholas also seems to admit that the “single easy harmony” 
can be achieved only under the condition that there are, among the diverse 
religions of the world, enlightened rulers or prophets who recognize, encourage, 
and participate in dialogue. And, moreover, it would only be under the peaceful 
conditions established by these enlightened rulers and prophets that there 
would also be good reason for the hope that reason might (eventually) win out 
such that “all diversity of religions will be led to one orthodox faith.” (§ 3.8)4 
Despite the fact that Nicholas explicitly articulates these qualifications 
regarding the potential practical benefits of interreligious dialogue, a good deal 
of recent attention on the De pace fidei nevertheless focuses either on assessing 
Nicholas’ understanding of the practicality of achieving peace through an appeal 
to the fundamental unity of faith underlying all religions or on the coherence 
between his apparent ecumenism and the text’s apologetic ambitions on behalf 
of Christian theology.5 Taken in aggregate, then, it would be fair to say that these 
recent studies tend to be focused on the ramifications of Nicholas’ explicit 
attempts to reconcile his own presuppositions that, on the one hand, all temporal 
religious rites are equally accurate (or equally inaccurate) manifestations of the 
one true faith underlying them all and his insistence that, on the other hand, 
some specific rites – e.g., baptism and communion – are so intimately associated 
with the one transcendently unified faith that these specific rites are not merely 
optional but are, rather, required for entrance into the one true faith.  
Consequently, the manuductive process by which the representatives of 
other communities (especially those representing Islam and Judaism) are led to 
agreement with the Word and its apostolic representatives provokes suspicion. 
For instance, even leaving aside Nicholas’ record as a papal legate,6 it is difficult 
to square Nicholas’ apparent ecumenism with the fact that the imagined 
discourse of the De pace fidei denies the representative of Judaism the one thing 
that every other participant achieves. For, when the Jewish interlocutor is 
depicted as reluctant to acknowledge and accept the mystery of Incarnation, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
sapientum omnium talium ediversitatum quae in religionibus per orbem observantur peritia 
pollentium unam posse facilem quondam concordantiam reperiri, ac per eam in religione 
perpetuam pacem convenienti ac veraci medio constitui. 
3 Una est igitur religio et cultus omnium intellectu vigentium, quae in omni diversitate rituum 
praesupponitur. 
4 …perducetur omnis religionum diversitas in unam fidem orthodoxam. In relation to the 
rhetorical strategies of the De pace fidei and other works, see especially the discussions of 
Nicholas’ reliance on a conception of the ecumenical methods of “manuduction” (leading by 
the hand) and interpretatio pia in Biechler 1991, Biechler 2004, and Bakos 2011. 
5 See, for instance, Bakos 2011, Costigliolo 2012, Euler 1990, Helander 1993, and Levy et al. 
2014. 
6 For a discussion of Nicholas’ legatine decrees against Jews, see Izbicki 2004.  
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Persian points out that “it will be more difficult to bring the Jews than others to 
this belief for they admit nothing expressly about Christ.” Even more telling, to 
this remark, Peter simply responds: 
[T]hey have all these things in their scriptures about Christ; but following the 
literal sense they [refuse] to understand (intelligere nolunt). Nevertheless, this 
resistance of the Jews will not impede concord. For they are few and will not be 
able by arms to disturb the whole world. (§ 12.41, my emendation)7  
Indeed, it is precisely problematic passages such as this that make the 
dialogue seem so relevant to contemporary interests in the possibilities for and 
obstacles to interreligious dialogue. Therefore,  even though Nicholas’ own 
reflections on the potential practical efficacy of interreligious dialogue for 
bringing about peace are explicitly qualified in the ways I have identified above, I 
do believe that the recent scholarly attention on these troubling dimensions of 
the dialogue is merited. Nevertheless, attending to the qualifications that 
Nicholas offers in his own text suggests that there are other avenues that are 
worth exploring in the study of the De pace fidei. 
To be specific, in this essay, I do not intend to focus on either the extrinsic 
arguments of the De pace fidei, nor even why I think a reasonable person can 
only conclude that Nicholas’ insistence – assuming that it is even correct to 
interpret him as insisting on this – that peace can be achieved through a kind of 
manuductive interreligious dialogue modeled on the De pace fidei should 
provoke suspicion. Instead, I intend to call attention to the philosophical 
significance of the literary framework of the dialogue. That is, rather than treat 
the text as if its most important philosophical insights can be located in its 
recommendations for producing peace between religions in the temporal world 
or in its apologetic intentions on behalf of Christian theology, I intend to focus on 
the philosophical significance of Nicholas’ literary framework – a framework that 
itself seems to presuppose only that “faith” is the product of a tension between 
the extrinsic meaning of revealed doctrine(s) and the human being’s imaginative 
capacity to unfold meaning from mere doctrine.  
In this vein, it is important to note at the outset that the opening sentences 
of Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei frame the entire text by indicating that it was 
occasioned by a particular event in human history, the fall of Constantinople in 
1453:  
After the brutal deeds recently committed by the Turkish ruler at 
Constantinople were reported to a certain man, who had once seen the sites of 
                                                                        
7 PERSA: “…Erit tamen difficilius Iudaeos ad huius credulitatem conducere quam alios, quoniam 
ipsi de Christo nihil per expressum admittunt.” PETRUS: “Habent in suis scripturis de Christo illa 
omnia; sed litteralem sensum sequentes intelligere nolunt. Haec tamen Iudaeorum resistentia 
non impediet concordiam. Pauci enum sunt et turbare universum mundum armis non poterunt.” 
It is in light of this comment in particular that I have argued in other contexts (Aikin and 
Aleksander 2013 and Aleksander 2014) that Nicholas’ anti-Jewish sentiments constitute a 
betrayal of his own apologetic strategy in the De pace fidei. 
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those regions, he was inflamed by a zeal for God; with many sighs he implored 
the Creator of all things that in his mercy he restrain the persecution, raging 
more than ever because of different religious rites. (§ 1.1)8  
Yet while the reader of the De pace fidei is initially encouraged to think of 
the work as a response to that specific historical event, Nicholas quickly moves 
on to reframe the rest of the dialogue by taking it out of the temporal realm 
altogether. Immediately following the lamentation we have just read, Nicholas 
begins to construct a literary space in which he offers an imagined discussion 
that takes place at an “intellectual height” (intellectualem altitudinem, § 1.2) – or, 
as he puts it later, in “the heaven of reason” (in caelo rationis, § 19.68) – between 
the Incarnate Word (Verbum / Logos9) or Peter or Paul and seventeen 
(identified) “eminent men of this world” (viri graviores mundi huius, § 3.9) 
representing diverse provincial customs. In all, the seventeen representatives 
with speaking parts include: a Greek, an Italian, an Arab, an Indian, a Chaldean, a 
Jew, a Scythian, a Frenchman, a Persian, a Syrian, a Spaniard, a German, a Tartar, 
an Armenian, a Bohemian, an Englishman, and, although he is only given one 
sentence in the entire De pace fidei, a Turk (see § 4.47). Moreover, just as the 
opening of the dialogue emphasizes this literary framework, so, too, does the 
abrupt ending to the dialogue; for, at the end of the dialogue, these seventeen 
representatives of the world’s diverse religions are commanded by the King of 
kings to return to the temporal world “and lead the nations to the unity of true 
worship” and to “come together in Jerusalem as to a common center and accept 
one faith in the name of all.” (§ 19.68)10 
To see why this literary framing of the De pace fidei is worth our attention, 
let me begin, then, with a few questions to help highlight its peculiarity. In the 
first place, I think we should wonder: to what point or points in history are these 
interlocutors commanded to return at the end of the dialogue? While the text is 
clear enough about the geographic locations from which each interlocutor is 
drawn and to which each is therefore returned, the question of the historical 
periods from whence they come is curiously and conspicuously ambiguous. 
Indeed, the first human interlocutor identified in the De pace fidei is described as 
                                                                        
8 Fuit ex hiis, quae apud Constantinopolim proxime saevissime acta per Turkorum regem 
divulgabantur, quidam vir zelo Dei accensus, qui loca illarum regionum aliquando viderat, ut 
pluribus gemitibus oraret omnium creatorem quod persecutionem, quae ob diversum ritum 
religionum plus solito saevit, sua pietate moderaretur. 
9 In De pace fidei, Nicholas typically signifies Christ with Verbum. But in § 10.27, for instance, 
Nicholas makes explicit the notion that, in this sense, Verbum should be understood as 
identical to Logos: “Reason, which is the Logos or Word, emanates from that which speaks it so 
that when the Omnipotent speaks the Word, those things which are enfolded in the Word are 
made in reality…” (ratio autem quae <logos> seo verbum, a proferente emanate ut, cum 
Omnipotens Verbum profert, facta sint ea in re quae in Verbo complicantur). 
10 Et mandatum est per Regem regum ut sapientes redeant et ad unitatem veri cultus nationes 
inducant… et deinde cum plena omnium potestate in Iherusalem quasi ad centrum commune 
confluent et omnium nominicus unam fidem acceptant. 
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being “older than the others and apparently a Greek” (prae ceteris senior et, ut 
apparuit, Graecus, § 4.10). Is it not tempting to assume that this Greek is raptured 
from ancient Athens, led to the conclusion that wisdom is one and whole, and 
then returned, not to Constantinople of 1453, but to the Athens of some ancient 
past? In fact, if the reference to Eusebius near the end of the dialogue (§ 19.68) 
can be taken as any indication, perhaps we are even encouraged to imagine – 
almost as if in a science fiction movie involving some form of time travel – that 
what was responsible for the historical introduction of a prisca theologica in 
ancient Orphic and Platonic sources – i.e., of a preperatio evangelica – is this very 
conversation that is occasioned by the response of the King of kings to the 
lamentations of both Nicholas of Cusa himself in 1453 as well as those expressed 
by the archangel whom Nicholas’ pilgrim saw in a vision occasioned by his 
zealous meditation – and, perhaps occasioned, too, by our own lamentations 
today (and those of indefinitely many who are still to come in this world). In 
other words, the ambiguity of the historical origins of the text’s interlocutors 
suggest that it should be possible to imagine them to be representatives from 
various diverse times and places such that they are as equally likely to include a 
Jewish representative from Jerusalem of either 70 CE or 1453 CE (when, as 
Nicholas’ depiction of Peter would have it, “Jews [were] few and unable to 
trouble the world by force of arms”) as an Arab (whether Christian or Muslim) 
from Gaza of 2014. 
But, especially since this reading does seem to treat the De pace fidei as a 
science fiction novel, I feel that I owe a justification that can establish that I am 
not practicing a form of interpretive alchemy. It is therefore worth reflecting on 
the first three chapters of the dialogue in a little more detail. As I have already 
noted, the De pace fidei begins by describing a man who, having heard reports of 
the fall of Constantinople, beseeches God to intervene in the conflict. We are told 
that this man, over the course of prolonged meditation, came to recognize that, 
by attending to what is held in common by the wise men who exemplify devotion 
to the rites of specific communities, an underlying harmony can be found 
through which can be made possible a perpetual peace in the temporal world. 
Thus, the narrator says that he decided to set down the vision that led to this 
conclusion so that this insight could be shared with others. 
It is here that Nicholas indicates that his pilgrim had been taken up to an 
intellectual height where he witnessed a conversation between the King of 
heaven and earth and angelic messengers bearing laments from every part of the 
world before the full assembly of saints. Perhaps we are also encouraged to think 
that the pilgrim who was carried up to this heaven was even included as a 
participant in the dialogue, for, like the pilgrim himself, the other participants in 
the dialogue are described as existing in this heaven quasi in extasim rapti – that 
is, as if raptured into ecstasy (§ 3.9). In any case, as I have already suggested, the 
identification of distinct geographical locations might also function as temporal 
markers in the literary framework of the De pace fidei. Accordingly, it seems 
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tempting to suppose that the angels, at this juncture in the text, are delivering 
laments from various specific places and times in the world to a heavenly court 
in which the conversation must unfold through an intemporale tempus – to 
borrow an expression that Nicholas frequently uses in his later work, the De 
aequalitate of 1459.  
There are several points that compel this interpretation. First, it seems 
safe to assume that the fact that the angels deliver their laments before the full 
assembly of saints acknowledges that this heaven of reason is one that enfolds 
within itself the completion or fulfillment of the temporal world (I will offer a 
justification for this point below). Second, we are told that these angels – or 
intellectual powers – had been established by the King of the universe from the 
beginning over each of the worldly provinces and over each of the religious sects. 
Third, when we turn to the supplication of the archangel, Nicholas seems to be 
suggesting that the lament that is offered for the fall of Constantinople can be 
treated as a single specific expression of the same generic lament for human 
fallenness that the archangel offers, for the archangel does not refer to the 
specific event of the fall of Constantinople – or to any specific event – but instead 
points out that “it is a characteristic of the earthly human condition that a 
longstanding custom which is taken as having become nature is defended as 
truth. Thus not insignificant dissensions occur when each community prefers its 
faith to another.” (§ 1.4)11 Moreover, the King of heaven’s response to this 
lamentation is similarly generalizable rather than tied in any specific way to the 
events of 1453. In fact, the reply is brief as well as general; the King of kings 
simply reminds the heavenly company that because human beings “walk in 
accordance with the conditions of the sensible life… and not in accordance with 
the intellectual inner man” (§ 2.7)12 it was necessary to provide prophets to help 
rectify human will but that, when these failed, it was also necessary to send into 
the world the Word through which he had also created the world. This Word, we 
are told, was “clothed with humanity so that at least in this way he might 
illuminate the docile man having a most free choice and so that he might see that 
he should walk not according to the outward man but according to the inner 
man.” (§ 2.7)13 
                                                                        
11 Habet autem hoc humana terrena condicio quod longa consuetudo, quae in naturam transisse 
accipitur, pro veritate defenditur. Sic eveniunt non parvae dissensiones, quando quaelibet 
communitas suam fidem alteri praefert. 
12 Ambulans secundum condiciones vitae sensibilis… et non secundum intellectualem interiorem 
hominem. 
13 Quod induit humanitate, ut sic saltem hominem docilem liberrimi arbitrii illuminaret, et 
videret non secundum exteriorem sed interiorem hominem ambulandum, si aliquando reverti 
speraret ad immortalis vitae dulcedinem. Strangely, this doesn’t answer the archangel’s request 
for clarification about why human beings are misled. Recall that the archangel has pointed out 
that human beings are misled by taking mere signs of the truth for the real thing. The King of 
heaven’s response is that he sent prophets and the Incarnate Word to rectify this failure. But 
of course, this is somewhat circular since it is only by mistaking belief in the mere extrinsic 
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In light of these observations, the explicit temporal markers in the 
dialogue should rightly seem more puzzling than they might otherwise. From the 
reader’s perspective, God’s response to the lamentation seems to stand at the 
present moment looking back upon the past and in preparation for the unfolding 
of a future. But, as I have already noted, there does not seem to be any 
compelling reason to assume that it is, in fact, 1453 in the dialogue’s imagined 
discourse in the heaven of reason. Or, rather, perhaps it is more accurate to say 
that it would not seem to violate the spirit of the text to allow that it might be, 
simultaneously, 399 BCE, 1453 CE, and 2014 CE in the heaven of reason. Indeed, 
since the temporal world is, for Nicholas, the image of the eternal, and since all 
things, both temporal and eternal, are enfolded in and unfolded through the 
Incarnate Word, each place and event in the temporal world is present in the 
eternal from which it is unfolded. Hence the past, present, and future are images 
through which the Word manifests itself to the human intellect – they are, as 
Nicholas puts it in the De ludo globi, measuring instruments created by the 
rational soul for the purposes of describing and understanding the world.14 But 
that these events unfold through the immutable divine intellect and can each 
also be measured by an arche and an eschaton of their own unique unfoldings is 
emphasized by the King of king’s final response to the archangel’s lament: “Since 
these things have been done, what is it that could have been done and was not?” 
(§ 2.7) 
In other words, unless we imagine that the answer to the King of king’s 
apparently rhetorical question is that something else should have been done that 
was not done, then we are led, I think, to the conclusion that the dialogue that 
subsequently transpires between the Word and the raptured representatives of 
specific communities is offered as an imagined conversation between 
representatives of both different regions and times in whom a single wisdom is 
contracted and hidden from view by the very diversity of rites that distinguish 
them as representatives of these different times and places. If so, however, then 
far from suggesting that this interreligious dialogue in the heaven of reason will 
help resolve the specific crisis of 1453, the De pace fidei occasions mainly the 
recognition that the distortion of human will that occurs when longstanding 
custom is taken as having become nature and is defended as truth is a pervasive, 
probably ineliminable feature of human existence, for it is through signs that we 
identify meaning, but it is also our attachment to these signs that distorts our 
will in making use of the meanings that we find. 
The forgoing literary analysis ought to be enough to raise the question 
about the philosophical significance of the literary framework of the De pace 
                                                                                                                                                       
signs of the one true faith as faith itself that people seem to go wrong, so how is it that 
supplying prophets is supposed to prevent this from happening? 
14 See especially De ludo globi II, § 94. For a discussion of the De ludo globi’s philosophy of 
time, see Duclow and Wikström 2011 and Duclow’s forthcoming “Tempus – Aeternitas – 
Perpetuum ‘Eternal Time’: Nicholas of Cusa on World, Time and Eternity.” 
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fidei. However, before I offer my own conclusion about the possible philosophical 
ramifications of this analysis, I would like to offer a caveat of sorts. I hope I have 
not given the impression that I believe Nicholas was not deeply troubled by the 
events of 1453. And I certainly do not intend to argue that the literary aspects of 
the De pace fidei indicate that Nicholas was entirely unconcerned with practical 
questions about how to bring about peace between parties thrown into conflicts 
with each other that are occasioned by or, at least, catalyzed by each party’s 
investment in its own unique rites and beliefs. In fact, I happen to believe that 
Nicholas did intend for the De pace fidei to persuade its Christian readers to take 
a more moderate tone and different approach to the problem raised by what 
most of his European contemporaries regarded as a grave threat to their 
particular way of life. We have, for instance, the evidence of Nicholas’ epistolary 
communication with Juan de Segovia in which it seems fairly clear that Nicholas 
did believe that a method of manuduction could serve as a practical and 
expedient means of achieving peace – even though we must acknowledge, I think, 
that Nicholas in no way suggests that the specific methods one should employ 
ought to be modeled on the conversation that is depicted in the De pace fidei.15 
Nevertheless, I think I have made a case for the claim that the question of 
how to create and sustain interreligious dialogue is not, after all, the most 
philosophically significant question raised by the De pace fidei. Indeed, even 
were I to grant that Nicholas did intend a practical political outcome in writing 
the De pace fidei, it seems to me that any such intention is constantly subverted 
by the ambiguities and paradoxes introduced by the literary framework in which 
the text offers itself for interpretation. In short, even if these literary puzzles do 
not undermine one’s confidence in overt claims of the text about the practical 
efficacy of interreligious dialogue, they do, I contend, make possible a different 
kind of practical outcome – one that is more fundamental to Nicholas’ philosophy 
and theology than even the concern for temporal peace. This other practical aim, 
I would argue, is to accomplish the activation of human will by placing the 
reader’s intellect in a state of suspension. By abducting the reader from a state of 
present belief and carrying the reader as a fellow pilgrim into an allegorical 
space in which there is a tension between the literal and figurative dimensions of 
                                                                        
15 In response to a letter from Juan de Segovia in 1454 laying out both practical and theological 
reasons why dialogue rather than force would be the most effective way of dealing with the 
reality of contemporary conflicts with Muslims (especially Turks), Nicholas replied telling his 
interlocutor about his own De pace fidei, and, as James Biechler has pointed out, also offered 
“enthusiastic support” and suggested “a practical addition to Segovia’s proposal” that 
recommended that the Christian side of any interreligious conferences “be placed in the hands 
of influential laymen rather than priests because, he said, the Turks would prefer these.” 
(Biechler 1991, p. 200) Excerpts from Juan de Segovia’s letter and Nicholas’ full response can 
be found in De pace fidei cum epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia, vol. 7 of the Opera omnia of 
Nicholas of Cusa. For a summary of the chapter headings of his letter to Nicholas of Cusa, see 
also Housley 1996, 144-47. For further discussion of Juan de Segovia’s part in this, see Wolf 
2014. 
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the text, Nicholas renders the reader’s intellect over to the need to choose a 
future direction for its attention. In this respect, the imaginative space of the De 
pace fidei converts mere belief in doctrine – nothing but a present and contracted 
manifestation of truth – into an active experience as an occasion for the exercise 
of free choice.16 Or, put differently, the imaginative space of the De pace fidei 
sacrifices the certainty of revealed doctrines in order to make possible a turning 
– a conversion – of will and intellect together toward a faith that might best be 
described as a variety of learned ignorance. Indeed, it is in this respect that 
Nicholas’ text might be better understood as offering a rich philosophical reason 
for its readers to be modest and moderate in their ecumenical ambitions, for the 
text does not so much give us a model for how to have conversations with others 
as it does offer us a reason to be wary of the veracity of our own doctrines (and 
so, too, to be wary of the text’s own apologetic bent). Thus an interpretation of 
the intemporale tempus in which the conversation of the De pace fidei is imagined 
to occur gives an occasion for its readers to practice the kind of self-mastery that 
is recommended in one of Nicholas’ earlier works, De filiatione Dei (1445) – and 
so I will close with this quotation from that work:  
We who aspire unto being God’s sons are admonished not to cling to sensible 
objects, which are symbolic signs of the true, but rather, because of our 
infirmity, to use these objects – without any polluting adherence thereto – in 
the following manner: as if through them the Teacher-of-truth were speaking to 
us and as if they were books containing the expression of His mind. And, in that 
case, we will contemplate intellectual things in and through sensible things; and 
we will ascend [contemplatively], by means of a certain disproportional 
parallelism, from transitory and insubstantial temporal things, whose being is 
in constant flux, unto eternal things, where all succession is caught up into the 
abiding permanency of rest. And we will have leisure for the contemplation of 
that true, just, and joyous life. We will be free from all pollution (which draws 
us downward), so that with ardent desire for learning more of God, and being 
free from this world, we can enter into that life by attaining mastery.17 
                                                                        
16 Indeed, although it does not mitigate Nicholas’ anti-Judaism, it does explain the presence of 
the “villain” in the text – the Jew, Peter says, refuses to give up the literal meaning (see § 
15.53). Thus, the figure of the Jew within the De pace fidei refuses to practice the right form of 
reading and therefore mimics the fall of man by relinquishing the opportunity to exercise free 
will in response to the interpretive demands required for faith. (Ironically, Nicholas adduces 
from his own characterization of Jewish stubbornness – evinced, one supposes, by reports of 
Jewish acts of Kiddush HaShem – the conclusion that Jews at least implicitly believe in the 
possibility of individual immortality.) 
17 Admonemur nos, qui ad filiationem dei aspiramus, non inhaerere sensibilibus, quae sunt 
aenigmatica signa veri, sed ipsis ob infirmitatem nostram absque adhaesione coinquinationis ita 
uti, quasi per ipsa nobis loquatur magister veritatis et libri sint mentis eius expressionem 
continentes. Et tunc in sensibilibus contemplabimur intellectualia et ascendemus quadam 
improportionali comparatione de transitoriis et fluidis temporalibus, quorum esse est in instabili 
fluxu, ad aeterna, ubi rapta est omnis successio in fixam quietis permanentiam, et vacabimus 
circa speculationem verae, iustae et gaudiosae vitae separantes nos ab omni inquinamento 
deorsum se trahente, ut possimus cum ardenti desiderio studii circa ipsum eam ipsam vitam 
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